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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario in which a city is in unrest; a man has been killed
at the hands of police officers, so protestors have been filling the streets for
days, demanding change. 1 In the midst of a protest, a semi-truck enters a
closed road and barrels through thousands of protestors. The driver is taken
into custody. Law enforcement officers hold an impromptu press
conference to inform the city, although the conference is closed to the
public because of a global pandemic. In the press conference, the officers
state that a man has been taken into custody for swerving into the crowds,
and he has ties to a right-wing extremist group; however, the investigation is
ongoing. The media promptly reports on these official statements to amplify
this relevant government investigation to the public. Once the man is
released from custody, he wants to sue the media for defamation—he is not
a member of a right-wing extremist group, and the collision was an accident.
Should the media be liable for reporting the officials’ defamatory
statements, especially those of public concern? Before the Minnesota
Supreme Court extended the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover
official news conferences in Larson v. Gannett Co., 2 media organizations
could have been liable just for republishing the officers’ defamatory
statements. 3
What if, instead of just republishing the officers’ statements, the
ǂ Rachel Lantz, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022. The Author is a second-year law student at
Mitchell Hamline School of Law. She is inspired to learn about the law each and every day
because of her supportive family and friends, including her mother, Cheryl Lantz, who has
taught her that knowledge is power. Special thanks to Professor Raleigh Levine and Claire
Gutknecht for their support and expertise throughout the publication process.
This imaginary scenario is based on real events that occurred in summer 2020 in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. However, there was never a press conference in which officers
made defamatory statements about the semi-truck driver. See Pam Louwagie & Jessie Van
Berkel, Tensions on Streets Slowly Ebb in Wake of George Floyd’s Death, STAR TRIB. (June
2, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/tensions-on-streets-ebb-in-wake-of-george-floyd-sdeath/570942192/ [https://perma.cc/37BM-GTAD] (explaining the killing of George Floyd
and resulting protests); see also Tanker Truck Drives Into Minneapolis George Floyd
Protestors on I-35W Bridge; Driver in Custody, CBS MINN. (May 31, 2020),
https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/05/31/breaking-semi-truck-appears-to-drive-throughprotest-marchers-on-i-35w-bridge/ [https://perma.cc/CVS6-HFT2].
940 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 2020).
Id. at 132 (noting that extending the fair and accurate reporting privilege to official law
enforcement news conferences and official press releases is an issue of first impression in
Minnesota).
1

2
3
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media reported that the man was not only brought into custody, but was also
arrested and charged because he intended to run over the protestors? That
exaggerated report, while loosely based on information garnered from the
news conference, would not be a fair and accurate representation of the
officers’ statements. Should the report still be privileged? If not, how should
the court determine when exaggerations go too far? The Larson court had
to grapple with these exact questions as they established a new inquiry to
determine whether a report is fair and accurate. 4
Larson is a case about defamation, an individual’s ability to recover,
and the power of the media. In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
extended the fair and accurate reporting privilege—for the first time—to
protect media publications “that accurately and fairly summarize statements
about a matter of public concern made by law enforcement officers during
an official press conference and in an official news release.” 5 This privilege
relieves a media company of liability for publishing defamatory statements
spoken by officials. 6 The power of this privilege is both encouraging and
frightening. On one hand, protecting the media from liability may serve
public interest by advancing and unveiling corrupt government practices.
On the other hand, if not contained, this privilege may advance the media’s
ability to report disinformation without repercussion. Even worse, the
privilege could prevent individuals from recovering for their damaged
reputation—a right guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution. 7
This Paper begins with an explanation of the origins of
defamation law and the fair and accurate reporting privilege, and it presents
the factual and procedural history of the Larson case. The Analysis argues
that the court correctly extended the privilege’s scope per precedent and
policy and established a comprehensive test that theoretically balances an
individual’s and the media’s conflicting interests. However, by remanding
the case, there remains a lack of clear boundaries concerning what
constitutes a fair and accurate report. 8 While the court reasonably protected
the media for public benefit, an individual’s ability to recover for his or her
tarnished reputation may have been diminished.
II. HISTORY

A.

Origins of defamation law and privileges
The tort of defamation allows a plaintiff to recover against a person

4
5
6
7
8

Id. at 133.
Id.
Id.
See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 143.
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who published false statements injuring the plaintiff’s reputation. 9 English
common law originally imposed strict liability against those who published
defamatory statements of another. 10 The common law rule of republication
holds publishers liable because “tale bearers are as bad as tale makers.” 11
The development of privileges helped eliminate the harsh sting of
defamation liability. 12 Absolute privileges have generally attached to specific
governmental proceedings to encourage people to speak freely without fear
of liability. 13 Conditional or qualified privileges protect speech that deserves
some immunity, but the protection may be forfeited if the privilege is
abused. 14 The fair and accurate reporting privilege is a qualified privilege
that can shield the press from defamation liability. 15

B.

Development of the fair and accurate reporting privilege in common
law and constitutional law

The fair and accurate reporting privilege originated as an
exception to the common law rule of republication, creating a common law
qualified defense. 16 With the fair and accurate reporting privilege, a
publisher could repeat defamatory statements made by others without
liability. 17 Because the privilege protects those who publish defamatory
statements, the underlying substance of the defamatory statement is not at
issue. Instead, the privilege is upheld if the publisher’s summary of the
defamatory statement is fair and accurate. 18
This privilege also has a constitutional source that originated when
the Supreme Court articulated First Amendment free speech implications
in defamation suits. 19 The Supreme Court rulings in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. constitutionally protected the

See Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Minn. 1985).
See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 328 (Minn. 2000); see
also Michael C. Cox & Elizabeth M. Callaghan, To Be or not to Be, Malice is the Question:
An Analysis of Nebraska’s Fair Report Privilege from a Press Perspective, 36 CREIGHTON
9

10

L. REV. 21, 23 (2003).
See Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 21.
11
12

See id.

RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
BROADCAST, & PRINT § 6:73 (2d ed.) (2020).
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

Id.
See Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 27.
See SMOLLA, supra note 13, at § 6:73.
Id.
Id. § 6:83.

IN

MEDIA CONTENT: INTERNET,

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); see also Cox & Callaghan,

supra note 10, at 21.
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media’s right to discuss public officials and figures. 20 In Sullivan, the First
Amendment protected a newspaper that published an editorial critiquing a
public official in his official capacity. 21 Sullivan created an “actual malice”
standard that required a public official to prove a defamatory statement was
made with knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity to recover for
defamation. 22 This test helped “protect the enterprise of news reporting
from the chilling effects of defamation suits.” 23 As a result, Sullivan protects
false reports about public officials published without actual malice. 24 Sullivan
made falsity an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case so that plaintiffs
have the burden to prove the inaccuracy of defendants’ statements. 25 This
landmark case protected the press’s freedom to report on public officials. 26
Gertz clarified that private individuals could prevail “on a less
demanding showing than that required by New York Times,” recognizing
that private individuals have a greater interest in protecting their reputation
than those who place themselves in the public eye. 27 Gertz also clarified that
states may decide the liability standard for publishers of defamatory
information regarding private individuals, as long as they do not impose
strict liability or violate First Amendment considerations. 28 This case
recognizes the two opposing interests in Larson: a private person’s ability to
recover from a defamatory statement and the press’s free speech in
reporting on official reports, regardless of its defamatory nature. 29 In doing
so, the Gertz Court suggested a private individuals’ right falls between the
harsh, strict liability imposed at common law and the heightened “actual
malice” standard required by Sullivan for public officials. 30 In recognizing
the press’s need to speak freely, the Gertz Court ensured the press had “the
‘breathing space’ essential to [its] fruitful exercise.” 31 Gertz recognizes a
minimum threshold of liability, compelled by the First Amendment, by
requiring that states not impose defamation fault without liability. 32
The Supreme Court has provided minimum constitutional
guidance for states imposing defamation liability standards. Philadelphia
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (allowing the press a right to freely discuss public officials by
requiring a showing of malice to prove defamation); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 346 (1974) (differentiating the defamation standard of Sullivan for private individuals).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282–83.
Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 282.

20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id. at 270–71.
Id.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).

Id. at 347.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 347.
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Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps builds on Gertz’s new boundaries for private

figures, holding that “the Constitution still supplants the standards of the
common law” when speech is made about a private figure regarding a matter
of public concern. 33 Thus, a plaintiff bringing a defamation claim under
these circumstances has a greater burden than a purely private plaintiff, but
a burden less than a public figure. 34 As in both Gertz and Sullivan, it is the
plaintiff’s burden to show falsity before recovering damages. 35 The private
figure in Hepps was required to prove falsity of the media defendant’s
speech, which regarded a matter of public concern, before recovery. 36
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, a statute was unconstitutional
because it imposed sanctions on media that accurately published a rape
victim’s name obtained from judicial records that were open to public
inspection and court proceedings. 37 The Court found that a plaintiff’s
privacy interest was lessened because the information was already available
on a public record. 38 As Justice White explained, the press is a vital
connection between the citizen and the government. 39 Florida Star v. B.J.F.
further balanced free press and state-created privacy protections, holding
that “where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly
tailored to a state interest of the highest order.” 40 Thus, the Court recognized
that imposing liability for truthful reporting may be more dangerous than
many state interests. 41
Throughout these constitutional developments, confusion remains
at the state level for both defamation plaintiffs and the media. Because Gertz
allows states to establish their own standards for defamation law as long as
they are not infringing upon free speech rights, various forms of the fair and
accurate reporting privilege are recognized across jurisdictions. 42 As a result,

33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).

Id.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 768–69.

Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).

Id.
Id. at 491 (“In a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with

which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon
the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations.”).
491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
40
41

Id.

John J. Watkins Charles, Gertz and the Common Law of Defamation: Of Fault, Nonmedia
Defendants, and Conditional Privileges, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 823, 879 (1984). There are
generally three ways states may approach such a conditional privilege: they may not recognize
a privilege, have a privilege that may be defeated by “a showing of knowing falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth,” or allow the privilege to be defeated by “knowing falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth as well as such common-law methods as improper motive or excessive
42
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states are inconsistent in their tests of fair and accurate reports, where the
privilege applies, and what will defeat the privilege. 43 This varied application
causes confusing and different applications of the privilege across
jurisdictions, to which Minnesota is no exception.

C.

The fair and accurate reporting privilege in Minnesota

The Minnesota Constitution recognized an individual’s right to
recover for defamation by proclaiming an individual is “entitled to a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his
person, property or character . . . .” 44 However, the Minnesota Supreme
Court first limited this right by endorsing the fair and accurate reporting
privilege in Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co. 45 The court conservatively
endorsed the privilege by holding that reports on judicial proceedings are
privileged, but reports on judicial pleadings were outside the privilege’s safe
harbor. 46 The court drew the line between reports on pre-trial and post-trial
materials. 47 Reports on pre-trial materials are not privileged because the
materials are not in the court’s control, and “publication can in no manner
serve the administration of justice.” 48 However, reports regarding claims
made in court may be protected because a judge can ensure fair procedural
safeguards for both parties. 49 One reason for distinguishing between pre- and
post-trial materials may be because the Nixon decision came before the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure’s safeguard against frivolous
complaints, and so the court held an interest in ensuring proceedings were
fairly moderated before the media reported. 50 This first appearance of the
fair and accurate reporting privilege in Minnesota held that reports may be
protected if they fairly and accurately regard judicial proceedings. 51
However, since the 1907 Nixon decision, the United States free
speech climate has changed due to the constitutional backdrop of Sullivan,
Gertz, and other free speech developments. 52 These changes caused the
Minnesota Supreme Court to respond to Gertz by adopting a negligence
standard, finding that a private individual may recover upon showing the
publication.” Id. However, most fair and accurate reporting privileges may be defeated by a
showing the publication is not a fair or accurate report of the original proceeding. Id.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id.

MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.

See 101 Minn. 309, 313, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.

Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 137 (Minn. 2020).

See id.
See supra Section II.B.
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defendant knew or should have known that the defamatory statement was
false. 53
The fair and accurate reporting privilege has developed in
Minnesota—although minimally—since its original appearance in Nixon
through a combination of statutes and selective adoption by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. A criminal defamation statute, adopted by the legislature
post-Nixon, privileges communications that “consist of a fair and true report
or a fair summary of any judicial, legislative or other public or official
proceedings.” 54 While this statute imposes criminal liability, the Minnesota
Federal District Court has persuasively argued that because the criminal
statute mentions “public or official proceedings,” news reports regarding
official, public reports should also be privileged in the civil setting. 55
In Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., the Minnesota
Supreme Court adopted the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover
legislative proceedings. 56 A police officer brought a defamation suit against
a local newspaper which reported a citizen’s alleged defamatory statements
made about the officer at a city council meeting. 57 The court adopted the
privilege to cover these circumstances and reasoned that the “public interest
is served by the fair and accurate dissemination of information concerning
the events of public proceedings.” 58 The court was persuaded by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 611 comment b that states once a
report is within the range of the fair and accurate reporting privilege, fault is
determined by the report’s accuracy and not by a common law malice
showing. 59 Once extending the privilege to city council meetings, the court
should have determined whether the newspaper article was fair and

Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 (Minn. 1985).
MINN. STAT. § 609.765 subdiv. 3(3) (1963) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 609.765
subdiv. 3(3) (2020)).
See Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 979 (D. Minn. 1978)
(holding that an accurate report of a grand jury indictment did not constitute defamation).
Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2000) (holding
that an officer’s defamation suit was defeated by the fair and accurate report privilege because
the privilege extended to events that were regular business of a city council meeting, including
a citizen’s ad hoc speech).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 331. The other standard that could have been adopted is an “actual malice” standard
in which a showing of “knowing or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement”
must be made. Id. at 329. This standard is not satisfied if a plaintiff only proves that the
defendant should have known a statement was false, without showing the defendant did know
the statement was false. Id. Actual malice is still a lesser standard from common law malice
which requires proof of “ill will or improper motive.” Id.
53
54

55

56

57
58
59
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accurate, or whether the report was edited to be misleading. 60 However, the
court did not make this inquiry; it remanded the case to the district court to
determine if additional contextual material—not on appeal—impermissibly
commented on the officers’ integrity. 61 Minnesotans were left without clear
boundaries of what will defeat the fair and accurate reporting privilege.
Yet, Moreno established that Minnesota’s fair and accurate
reporting privilege protects fair and accurate reports of regular city council
meetings, and the qualified privilege is “defeated by a showing that the
report is not a fair and accurate report of that proceeding.” 62 This was the
last time the court addressed the fair and accurate reporting privilege until
the Larson decision.
III.

THE LARSON DECISION

In Larson v. Gannett Co., the plaintiff brought a defamation suit
against the local media company after being falsely accused of murdering a
police officer in Cold Spring, Minnesota. 63 The plaintiff argued the media
company should be liable for publishing defamatory statements naming him
as the murderer, as the statements did not fairly and accurately represent
the official news conferences and press releases regarding his arrest for the
murder. 64 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the scope of
the fair and accurate reporting privilege. 65 The privilege now protects fair
and accurate reports on official news conferences and press releases. 66 The
court also established a test to determine whether the media’s reports were
fair and accurate—whether the reports created the same “gist” or “sting” as
the original news conference and press release. 67

A.

Facts of the Larson case

In 2012, a Cold Spring police officer responded to a welfare
check request on Ryan Larson, during which the officer was shot and
killed. 68 An hour later, officers entered Larson’s apartment, found Larson
sleeping, and took him into custody on suspicion of murder. 69 The next
Id. (replacing the common law requirements that a publication be made in good faith,
without malice); see also Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 30 (noting that common law
malice created a qualified privilege).
Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 334.
Id. “The privilege is not defeated by a showing of common law malice.” Id.
Id. at 126.
60

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 126. The officer was shot twice outside the bar that Larson lived above. Id.
Id.
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morning, law enforcement officers held a live press conference and
answered questions about the investigation. 70 One officer reported that “the
subject of the welfare check” had been taken into custody. 71 The officials
indicated that while the suspect was in custody, the investigation was active
and ongoing. 72 At the end of the press conference, another officer stated,
“Ryan Larson was taken into custody and booked . . . in connection with
this incident.” 73 When media asked if there was any other person of interest
for the murder, the officials responded, “we don’t have any information to
believe that at this time.” 74 The same day, the Minnesota Department of
Public Safety released an official press release titled “Cold Spring Police
Officer Killed in the Line of Duty.” 75
That night, Kare 11 released evening news and online reports that
depicted Larson as a murderer, with headlines stating, “Police say that man—
identified as 34 year-old Ryan Larson—ambushed Officer Decker and shot
him twice—killing him.” 76 The St. Cloud Times newspaper also released
numerous front-page articles alleging that Ryan Larson shot the officer. 77
Larson was released from jail five days after being taken into
custody and officially cleared as a suspect for the murder in 2013. 78 Larson
sued the Gannett Company, the owners of the media outlets, for defamation
in eleven statements published in the Kare 11 television broadcasts, an
online article, and in the St. Cloud Times newspaper articles. 79

B.

District Court and Court of Appeals decisions

The district court jury trial occurred in 2016. 80 While eleven
statements were highlighted as grounds for defamation, three of the
statements were declared not “capable of . . . defamatory meaning” and
excluded from jury consideration. 81 The district court instructed the jury
using the “falsity” instruction—an instruction used to determine an element

Id. at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The press release discussed that investigators had taken Ryan Larson into custody in
relation to the murder. Id.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 128–29.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 130.
Id.

70
71
72
73
74
75

76
77
78
79
80
81
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of a regular defamation claim. 82 The jury found the remaining statements
defamatory, but not false. 83 After this result favoring the respondents, Larson
moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court granted in
part. 84 The district court set the jury’s verdict aside, finding the jury should
have been allowed to consider the claims on a defamation-by-implication
basis. 85 In doing so, the district court rejected the defendants’ argument that
the fair and accurate reporting privilege should extend to official news
conferences. 86 The court awarded Larson a new trial on all statements. 87
The respondents appealed Larson’s award of a new trial. 88 The
court of appeals reversed and reinstated judgment for respondents, finding
that eight statements were covered by the fair and accurate reporting
privilege. 89 The court of appeals found that the district court’s “falsity” jury
instruction appropriately directed “[the jury’s] attention on the substantial
accuracy of the news report,” and to “construe words as a whole . . . to assess
the meaning of each statement in context.” 90 As a result, the court of appeals
held that the jury made an adequate finding based on the given instructions,
and reentered judgment in favor of the defendants. 91 Larson appealed to the
Minnesota Supreme Court. 92
Id. at 141. See infra Section III.C.2 (discussing that this was not the correct instruction and
finding that the correct inquiry would compare the meaning of the report to the original
statements, not examine the underlying statements).
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 130. Statements one through eight, considered by the jury,
included: 1) “Police say that man—identified as 34-year-old Ryan Larson—ambushed officer
Decker and shot him twice—killing him”; 2) “Investigators say 34-year-old Ryan Larson
ambushed the officer, shooting him twice. Larson is in custody”; 3) “He [Officer Decker]
was the good guy last night going to check on someone who needed help. That someone was
34-year-old Ryan Larson who investigators say opened fire on Officer Tom Decker for no
reason anyone can fathom”; 4) “Investigators believe he fired two shots into Cold Spring
Police Officer Tom Decker, causing his death”; 5) “Police say Larson is responsible for the
shooting death of Cold Spring-Richmond Police Officer Tom Decker”; 6) “[The officer’s
mother] holds no ill-will against the man accused of killing her son”; 7) “Ryan Larson, the
man accused of killing Officer Decker, could be charged as early as Monday”; and 8) “Man
faces murder charge.” Id. at 129.
Id. at 130. Note, Larson did not ever request an instruction on republication liability, which
is the umbrella doctrine for the fair and accurate report privilege and the exception to the
common law republication rule. Id. The common law republication doctrine creates liability
when one repeats defamatory statements made by another. See id. at 130–31.
Id. at 130. This theory was dismissed at the court of appeals and supreme court. Id.
82

83

84

85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
Id.

Larson v. Gannett Co., 915 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).

Id. at 500.
Id. at 499. The Minnesota Supreme Court criticized this jury instruction because it requires

the jury to consider whether the underlying substance of the statements (“that Larson killed
Officer Decker”) was true. Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 143.
Larson, 915 N.W.2d at 500.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 130.

91
92
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The Minnesota Supreme Court decision to expand the scope of the
fair and accurate reporting privilege

Larson’s appeal brought an issue of first impression to the
Minnesota Supreme Court: should the fair and accurate reporting privilege
protect media reports on official press conferences and news releases? 93 The
Minnesota Supreme Court decided it should, holding that the fair and
accurate reporting privilege “protects news reports that accurately and fairly
summarize statements about a matter of public concern made by law
enforcement officers during an official press conference and in an official
news release.” 94 Consequently, the court found that the fair and accurate
reporting privilege could apply to seven of the statements as they “reported
information about a matter of public concern disseminated by the law
enforcement officers at the press conference and in the press release.” 95
However, the court found the jury instructions did not contain the relevant
factors to determine whether the privilege was defeated. 96 After establishing
a more focused inquiry to determine whether a report is fair and accurate,
the court remanded the case for a new trial so a jury could determine
whether the news reports were fair and accurate, or whether the privilege
was defeated. 97

1. Extension of Scope
In deciding to extend the privilege to cover official press
conferences and press releases, the court relied on policy established in
Moreno and First Amendment principles. 98 The first value Moreno
emphasized is that “the public interest is served by the fair and accurate
dissemination of information concerning the events of public
proceedings.” 99 Larson involved a public news conference, so the agency
principle was served—a person in attendance would receive the same

See id. at 131.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 142. The district court instructed the jury using the “falsity” jury instruction regularly
used for defamation claims. Id. This instruction inquires whether the content of the

93
94
95
96

statement was true or false but does not determine the accuracy for which the statement was
reported on. See id. See also infra Section III.C.2.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 126 (affirming court of appeals decision in part and reversing in
part as to separate statements not covered by fair and accurate reporting privilege); see also
infra Section IV.B.3.a (describing the new test).
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 131; Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321,
332 (Minn 2000).
See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 132 (quoting Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 332).
97

98

99
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information that a report about the meeting described. 100 While the court
does not discuss what makes a meeting “public” in other circumstances, it
accentuates that the purpose of the news conference at hand was to
communicate information to the general public. 101 Additionally, information
regarding the news conference was later made available to the public. 102
While Larson argued that a summary of the news conference does
not serve the “agency principle,” 103 the court rebutted that if a proceeding is
privileged, any fair and accurate summary of the proceeding must also be
privileged. 104 The court reasoned that the First Amendment protections and
public interest allow the press leeway to write summaries. 105 Additionally,
this privilege may be defeated if the summaries are not an “accurate and
complete report or a fair abridgement” of the official news conferences or
press releases. 106
Secondly, the Larson court extended the privilege because the news
conference and press release regarded a “matter of public concern,” similar
to Moreno. 107 Matters of public concern entail the highest amount of First
Amendment protection. 108 When public concern is at interest, the media
must be able to quickly disseminate information from government officials
to the public to promote public safety. 109 The press’s role is not only to
inform the public, but to increase government transparency by allowing the
public “to assess the quality of the state and local officials’ response to a
public safety emergency.” 110 Accordingly, the Larson court reasoned that the
media reports on a local police officer’s murder investigation regarded a
matter of public concern. 111 The court found that the media’s reports
increased transparency and promoted accountability of the investigation. 112
See id. at 133; Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 331 (finding that a fair and accurate report serves
the agency principle if it were to “simply relay information to the reader that she would have
seen or heard herself were she present at the meeting.”).
See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 133.
Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 134. Because the agency principle serves to relay information heard at a public
meeting, the plaintiff argued media summaries cannot “align with the privilege’s agency
principle.” Id.

100

101
102
103

104
105
106
107

Id.
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975); Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 134.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 134 (quoting Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 334).
See id. (quoting Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 331); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 611.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 134 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)) (“Speech
on matters of public concern ‘occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values, and is entitled to special protection.’”).
108

109
110
111
112

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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The third reason the court extended the privilege was to protect
reports about an “official action or proceeding.” 113 The fair and accurate
reporting privilege covers “statements made . . . during a planned, formal,
press conference, to convey information about an ongoing criminal
investigation of public interest, [because they] were official actions that were
part of an official proceeding.” 114 The court distinguishes that while
statements in a formal, planned setting are privileged, other
communications between law enforcement officers and the press may not
be. 115 In Larson, law enforcement officials organized the news conference as
part of their official duties. 116 The court reasoned this official action, done in
furtherance of official duties, fit squarely within the definition of an official
proceeding. 117 An action or proceeding need not be “recurring” or “essential
to democracy” to be official. 118
Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the Legislature
included “public or official proceedings” in the state’s criminal defamation
statute, it is reasonable to extend the privilege to public or official
proceedings in the civil context. 119 While the court was persuaded by section
611 of the Restatement, it did not endorse the entire Restatement because
it only incrementally advanced the privilege on these facts. 120
The court argues its ruling does not overrule Nixon. 121 Nixon was
distinguishable because it regarded reports on pleadings made by a private
citizen about a private citizen. 122 Additionally, Nixon was decided sixty years
before the United States Supreme Court ruled on First Amendment
See id. at 135 (quoting Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 334
(Minn 2000); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 136.
See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. d, h. Comment (h) states
that while an arrest is an official action and reports of the action are privileged, “statements
made by the police . . . are not yet part of the judicial proceeding or of the arrest itself and
are not privileged under this Section.” Id. The court found comment (h) irrelevant because
it explains that when an official makes defamatory comments in addition to the proceeding
at issue, and not as part of the proceeding, the privilege may be defeated; here, the comments
were part of the full, official press conference. Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 136–38.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 135.
113

114
115

116

Id.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 133; see MINN. STAT. § 609.765 subdiv. 3(3) (1963) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 609.765 subdiv. 3(3) (2020)); see also Schuster v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., 459 F.

117
118
119

Supp. 973, 978 (D. Minn. 1978) (arguing that Minnesota’s criminal defamation statute
should be applied in the civil context).
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 133.
See id. at 136–37.
Id.; compare id. at 139 (extending fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover official
proceedings, including official press conferences and releases) with Nixon v. Dispatch
Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907) (holding that pleadings filed with
the court, not yet part of judicial proceedings, are not privileged).
120
121
122
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implications of defamation in Sullivan v. New York Times. 123

2. Creation of “gist” or “sting” test
After deciding the privilege covered the press conference at issue in

Larson, the Minnesota Supreme Court had to determine which test would

define whether a report is fair and accurate—that is, what will defeat the
privilege. The district court’s “falsity” jury instructions were insufficient. 124
Although the jury instruction’s substantial accuracy inquiry was relevant, it
was not clear whether the inquiry was directed at the underlying official
statements or whether the media’s statements were fair and accurate reports
of the official statements. 125 To correct this mistake, the Minnesota Supreme
Court described the correct inquiry as follows.

a. The Larson Majority
The court established that the fair and accurate reporting privilege
“‘is defeated by a showing that the report is not a fair and accurate report’
of the public proceeding.” 126 Once the defendants have shown that the
privilege covers the proceedings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
the privilege has been defeated. 127 A report that is fair and accurate will
provide the same “gist” of the defamatory statements as if the reader was
present at the proceeding. 128 It cannot be edited or add contextual
information that would be misleading. 129 The report must be “substantially
accurate.” 130 While the court addressed that a report cannot add contextual
material, it did not discuss whether adding “jocular commentary” would be
tolerated. 131
Compare Nixon, 101 Minn. at 313, 112 N.W. at 259 (1907) with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 141. The district court found the privilege did not apply to official
proceedings and instructed the jury on the element of “falsity,” which is an element of a
general defamation claim. Id. at 140. The court of appeals found the “falsity” instruction was
sufficient to instruct the jury on determining the substantial accuracy of the news report. Id.
at 140–41.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 139 (quoting Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333
(Minn. 2000)).
Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court remanded for a new trial on the five statements. Id. at
145.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 139.
123

124

125
126

127

128
129
130
131

Id.
See id. at 142. But see Lee v. TMZ Prod., Inc., 710 F. Appx. 551, 559 (3d Cir. 2017)

(finding that a report on a news conference falsey accusing the plaintiff as being involved in
a prostitution ring was privileged because its jocular commentary did not change the
underlying statement).
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The jury instructions must frame the question so that the jury
determines the reported statements’ fairness and accuracy compared to the
official proceedings, and not whether the underlying official statements were
true or false. 132 The court established other guidelines, including that a fair
and accurate report will have “the same effect on the mind of the listener or
reader” as a person attending the press conference. 133 The privilege is
defeated if a report is edited to become misleading or is not a fair
abridgment of the proceeding. 134 Additional contextual material may defeat
the privilege. 135 The resulting inquiry, as stated by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, is: “Did the reported statements produce the same effect on the mind
of the listener or the reader as the oral and written statements of the law
enforcement officers at the press conference or in the press release?” 136
Because the jury instructions failed to state the applicable law, Larson is
entitled to a new trial with the corrected jury instructions to determine
whether the privilege was defeated for statements one through five. 137
Minnesota’s fair and accurate reporting privilege allows the jury to
decide whether the published reports were fair and accurate compared to
the official proceedings, unless no reasonable jury could conclude that the
statements were fair and accurate; then, the court must find the report is not
fair and accurate as a matter of law. 138 The correct inquiry analyzes the
fairness and “substantial accuracy” of the report; 139 the report need not be
“exact in every immaterial detail”; 140 the inquiry should address the effect on
the mind of the reader; 141 and additional comments may defeat the
privilege. 142

Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 143. All defamation claims will contain underlying statements that
are false; however, the fair and accurate report privilege intends to shield the media from
liability for republishing false statements that others said. Id. Thus, it is imperative that the
inquiry is whether the published statements are fair and accurate compared to the original
statements, not whether they are false. Id.
Id. at 142, 156 (quoting the adopted test from McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 730
(Minn. 2013)); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516–518
(1991) (holding that the element of falsity in the context of defamation will overlook minor
inaccuracies and focus on the substantial truth).
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 143.
132

133

134
135
136
137

Id.
Id.
Id. at 144. The court is only providing a trial on five of the original eleven statements;

statements seven and eight are fair and accurate as a matter of law, nine through eleven were
not capable of defamatory meaning. Id. at 130, 145.
Id. at 141, 145.
Id. at 142.
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Id.
Id. at 137.
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b. The Larson Concurrence/Dissent
The concurrence/dissent agrees with the majority that the test must
inquire whether the meaning of the report is the same as the meaning
communicated at the news conference. 143 Justice Gildea joined Justice
Anderson in his partial concurrence and partial dissent. The concurrence
argues the correct inquiry is “whether respondents’ reports about the law
enforcement press conference communicated the same meaning that
someone who actually attended the press conference would have taken away
from the press conference.” 144 This is similar to the majority’s test, which
analyzes whether the original and challenged statements carry the same gist
or sting. 145 However, after agreeing on the appropriate test, Justices
Anderson and Gildea found that the report was not fair and accurate as a
matter of law. 146

c. The aftermath of Larson
After the Minnesota Supreme Court ruling, the respondents
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court on August 27,
2020. 147 The respondents argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision placed the respondents at risk of liability for defamation when a
jury had already found the statements to be true. 148 Thus, a remand was
unnecessary because the jury assessed whether the media’s statements were
fair and accurate. 149 Respondents argued that the jury had already been
instructed on the “falsity” inquiry—the same test the Minnesota Supreme
Court advised on remand—and when given those instructions, found that
the statements were substantially accurate. 150 The writ was denied on
October 13, 2020. 151
IV.

ANALYSIS

The fair and accurate reporting privilege is essential to the
Id. at 149–50 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the
test described by the majority while dissenting that the privilege should extend to official
proceedings).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 143.
See id. at 161–62; discussion infra Section IV.B.3.c.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Gannett Co., Inc., v. Larson, 940 N.W.2d 120 (2020)
(No. 20-252), 2020 WL 5234948.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
Id. Note that the Minnesota Supreme Court, while providing similar instructions on
remand, clarified the correct focus of the substantial accuracy test is to compare the report
and original statements.
Gannet Co., Inc. v. Larson, cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 559 (2020).
143

144
145
146
147

148
149
150

151
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continued existence of the media. Without the privilege, the media would
be subject to increased liability and litigation—a deadly combination for large
and small news companies alike. 152 The media would be just as liable for
reports on a falsely accused person as the officers who originally issued the
false accusation. As a result, the media would likely be chilled in its
reporting. 153 However, this privilege conflicts with the Minnesota
Constitution, which guarantees that “[e]very person is entitled to a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries of wrongs which he may receive to his
person, property or character.” 154
Attempting to balance these conflicting interests, the Minnesota
Supreme Court extended the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover
reports on official news conferences and press releases regarding a matter
of public concern. 155 In expanding the scope of the privilege, the Minnesota
Supreme Court followed precedent and was guided by widely accepted
policy rationales. 156 Additionally, the court established a test to determine
what constitutes a fair and accurate report. 157 The resulting privilege greatly
protects the media. By tipping the scale to favor media protections, the
resulting precedent may disrupt recovery for plaintiffs like Larson.

A.

The scope of the privilege was correctly extended to official press
conferences and press releases.

For the first time in Larson, the court expanded the fair and
accurate reporting privilege to cover not only judicial and legislative
proceedings, but also official press conferences and press releases presented
by government officials regarding matters of public concern. 158 The
Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that extension of the privilege is proper
and does not overrule precedent. 159

1. Precedent
While Larson and the dissent argue that the majority exceeded the
privilege’s scope as established in Nixon that protected only judicial
See Robert J. Sheran & Barbara S. Isaacman, Do We Want a Responsible Press?: A Call
for the Creation of Self-Regulatory Mechanisms, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 48–49 (1982).
Id. (“The effect . . . [of lower fault standards] on the media is . . . fewer resources . . . [for]
152

153

their primary functions of gathering, editing, and disseminating the news . . . [making] the
media less effective in their job of keeping the public informed.”).
MINN. CONST. art. 1 § 8.
Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2020).
Id. at 133, 138.
Id. at 133.
See id. at 132.
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id.
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proceedings, 160 this argument fails to account for constitutional free speech
developments over the past eighty years. Additionally, the Larson decision
minimally expands upon the privilege’s scope established in Moreno, which
has been upheld. 161
The combined concurrence and dissent argues that the court’s
extension of the scope oversteps precedent, relying entirely on Nixon. 162
Nixon was the first Minnesota case to recognize the fair and accurate
reporting privilege by distinguishing that judicial proceedings are privileged
whereas pleadings are not. 163 Pleadings were excluded from the privilege in
1907 because they had not yet reached the court and did not allow both
sides to be heard, thus they were not considered judicial. 164 At that time,
professional rules against frivolous complaints did not exist; thus, privileging
complaints would allow anyone to amplify defamatory statements in the
newspaper by merely filing a complaint. 165 Since Nixon, procedural
safeguards against frivolous complaints now prevent such a scenario from
occurring. 166 While Nixon was appropriately decided in its time, the climate
surrounding free speech has changed. 167
Thus, when deciding to extend the privilege in Moreno for the first
time since Nixon, the court was responding to over eighty years of
constitutional free speech development in which speech—especially speech
regarding matters of public concern and government happenings—had great
protection. In Moreno, the court avoided overruling Nixon and extended
the fair and accurate reporting privilege to cover reports of regular business
in public city council meetings. 168 This extension was the springboard for
extending the privilege again in Larson.
Speech about public officials and official government acts is more
protected than speech about private citizens. 169 As a result, those that publish
public officials’ speech should be more protected than those who publish

See id. at 136, 152.
See id. at 132–33 (referencing the two principles on which the Moreno decision was based
as well as the court’s decision to uphold Moreno and apply the privileges protection in this
160
161

case).

162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id. at 148.

Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 313, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907).

See id.
See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 137.

MINN. R. CIV. P. 11.02 (requiring presentations to the court to be made in good faith).

See supra Section II.B.
See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2000).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (“Public officials and public

figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private
individuals normally enjoy.”).
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private citizens’ speech. 170 However, the court before Larson only extended
the privilege to publishers of private speech. 171 It would be inconsistent with
defamation precedent to deny the same privilege and liability protections to
publishers of public officials’ speech—a category of speech that is more
protected. 172 For example, if the court did not extend the privilege,
journalists reporting on law enforcement statements at a stand-alone press
conference discussing a killer-at-large would not be protected, but reporting
on a private citizen’s haphazard speech discussing the same issue at a
scheduled city council meeting would be protected. 173 If the Larson court
did not extend the privilege’s scope, the privilege’s application would be
inconsistent.
Larson and the concurrence/dissent also argued that the privilege
conflicts with Nixon. 174 However, Nixon did not discuss the privilege’s scope
beyond judicial proceedings. 175 Nixon privileged judicial proceedings
because they entailed a fair hearing that a judge had some control over. 176
For the same reasons, the privilege did not protect pleadings as they could
be frivolous and without merit. 177 This distinction was necessary because
Nixon involved a private party attempting to defame another private party
in pleadings. 178 In addition, protecting pleadings “can in no manner serve
the administration of justice, or any other legitimate object of public
interest.” 179 Entirely different than Nixon’s private pleadings, Larson
involves a public official’s statement on an investigation of public concern. 180
Additionally, a legitimate purpose of public interest is served by protecting
media reports about official law enforcement statements regarding a
Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 (1964) (barring liability for
press comments about public officials without proof of malice) with Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344
(“Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in
protecting them is correspondingly greater.”). The publishers of public officials’ speech
should have more protection than the publishers of private individuals’ speech.
See Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 333 (holding the privilege extended to a private individual
speaking at a city council meeting).
See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344; see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 260 (distinguishing between
categories of public versus private individuals).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Star Trib. Media Co., LLC, Associated Press, Fox/UTV Holdings,
LLC, ex rel. KMSP Fox 9, the Minn. Newspaper Ass’n & Rep. Comm. for Freedom of Press
at 10, Larson v. Gannett Co., 915 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018) (No. A17-1068), 2017
WL 10752201 [hereinafter Brief for Amici].
Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 136 (Minn. 2020).
Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 312, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907).
170

171

172

173

174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id.
Id.
Id. at 313, 259.
Id.
See generally Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 134 (Minn. 2020) (referring to the

publicly held press conference and press release involving the “slaying of a community police
officer”).
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suspected murderer at an official news conference. 181 The extension of the
privilege’s scope in Larson does not overrule Nixon, but clarifies an area
not previously considered. 182
Larson and the concurrence/dissent’s argument that the privilege,
if applied to official proceedings, must be limited to reports on arrests only
after commencing judicial actions would contradict the Moreno decision. 183
Moreno privileged speech that accused a private citizen of criminal activity
before any charges were filed. 184 The privilege’s scope would be inconsistent
if limited to reports only after a formal criminal charge commenced. And
with uncertainty, media speech would be chilled. 185 Larson correctly
expanded upon the Moreno framework by privileging reports on official
proceedings before judicial action commences.
The expansion of the privilege’s scope accords with Minnesota
precedent. Additionally, this expansion to official proceedings is consistent
with section 611 of the Restatement, 186 and rulings in jurisdictions outside of
Minnesota, including a case upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. 187

2. Policy of extending the privilege
Three policy theories support extending the fair and accurate
reporting privilege to official proceedings regarding matters of public
concern; agency, public interest in important matters, and public as
supervisors. 188 First, the media acts as government agents when it amplifies
181
182
183
184

See id. at 136.
See id.; see also Nixon, 101 Minn. at 309, 112 N.W. at 258.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 138.
Id. at 137 (finding that Nixon and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. h

support this reasoning).
See Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 875 (Minn. 2019) (“Courts
cannot offer recourse for injury to reputation at the cost of chilling speech on matters of
public concern.”); see also Wynn v. Smith, 16 P.3d 424, 430 (Nev. 2001) (“The purpose of
this exception is to obviate any chilling effect on the reporting of statements already accessible
to the public.”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (AM. LAW INST. 1975) (“The publication of
defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a
meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the
report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.”).
See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 287 (1971) (privileging an official government
organization’s report); see also Jones v. Taibbi, 512 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 1987) (extending
privilege to official statements by police departments); Wright v. Grove Sun Newspaper Co.,
873 P.2d 983, 990 (Okla. 1994) (privileging a press conference held by an investigator
because it is within the official duties of an officer).
See generally Paul Brock Bech, Isolating the Marketplace of Ideas from the World: Lee
v. Dong-A Ilbo and the Fair Report Privilege, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1989)
(describing agency, supervisory, and informational rationales to be the most widely used
explanations for the privilege); see also Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 27; 4 Minn. Prac.,
185

186

187

188

1150

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

official government messages that the public would hear if attending the
proceeding. 189 Second, the media holds government officials accountable by
exposing their actions to allow scrutiny of government policies and
corresponding activities. 190 The fair and accurate reporting privilege “reflects
the judgment that the[re is a] need, in a self-governing society, for freeflowing information about matters of public interest.” 191 Third, the public
has an interest and a right to be informed about matters of public concern. 192
The public will benefit by expanding the privilege in Minnesota to protect
media while reporting on official news conferences by public officials.

a. The “Agency” Rationale
The simplest supporting rationale for the fair and accurate
reporting privilege’s extension is that the media can only report what the
public would have heard if attending the official meeting themselves. 193
However, citizens are busy, and “in a society in which each individual has
but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the
operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring
to him in convenient form the facts of those operations.” 194 Just as the public
does not have the time to observe, local law enforcement agencies do not
have the platform to disseminate information as quickly and productively as
the media. 195 Consequently, the media is best situated to report on official
government proceedings. 196
However, some argue that the media may amplify government
speech which may not be widely known without the media’s help. 197 If the
media did not amplify the government’s speech, the speech would remain
in the time and place in which it was originally spoken. 198 As a result, when
the government happens to make defamatory statements, the person’s
injured reputation would not be as widespread but for the media’s
amplification.
The impact that greater liability would have on the media outweighs
this concern. If the media was not privileged to report on official
Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014) (citing agency and public interest in
public affairs, but not the public as supervisors, as the basis for the privilege).
Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
Lee v. TMZ Prods., Inc., 710 F. App’x 551, 557 (3d Cir. 2017).
Bech, supra note 188, at 1160.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1975); see also 4
Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014).
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
189
190
191
192
193

194
195
196
197
198

Id.
See id.
Bech, supra note 188, at 1159.
Id.
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government statements, the media could be chilled. 199 Media organizations
would either be cautious in their reporting or not report on public officials
at all if they could be liable for merely republishing statements that public
officials spoke—statements the media had no control over—which were later
found defamatory. This implication would be unfair; as the old saying goes,
“don’t shoot the messenger.” 200 Saving the media from the bullets of liability,
especially when they are solely amplifying speech by public officials on
matters of public concern, greatly benefits our society.

b. Public interest in matters of public concern
The public has a right to know about information shared at official
government proceedings. 201 If the media is not privileged when reporting on
such proceedings, they may hold back on reporting vital news or safety
concerns because of the extreme liability risk. 202
The media coverage of George Floyd’s death in May 2020
exemplifies the need for this privilege to cover official government
proceedings. As information regarding protests, riots, and escalated
situations changed, the media quickly and succinctly distilled the important
headlines from news conferences to benefit public safety. 203 Because of the
public and viral nature of the riots, police collected video footage to help
identify rioters, which created conditions ripe for false information to
quickly spread. For example, an individual dubbed the “Umbrella Man”
was videoed nonchalantly breaking AutoZone windows and falsely named
as a St. Paul police officer on social media channels. 204 The St. Paul police
department issued a press release clearing the falsely accused police officer’s
See, e.g., Wynn v. Smith, 16 P.3d 424, 430 (Nev. 2001) (“The purpose of this exception
is to obviate any chilling effect on the reporting of statements already accessible to the
public.”).
See generally Shooting the Messenger and Don’t Shoot the Messenger, GRAMMARIST,
https://grammarist.com/idiom/shooting-the-messenger-and-dont-shoot-the-messenger/
[https://perma.cc/G6W9-VEZN].
See 4 Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014); see also Bech,
supra note 188, at 1160.
See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2000).
Emily Haavik, Estefan Saucedo & Bill Strande, ‘Very few incidents’ reported Sunday
Night, Police Warn There are Still ‘Outside Agitators’ in Twin Cities, KARE 11 (June 1,
2020),
https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/george-floyd/george-floyd-protestsminneapolis-st-paul-day-six/89-0450ec60-6d6f-4472-a306-8b066cbd0fc8
[https://perma.cc/A7WH-EBF6] (reporting on Governor Walz’s news conference where the
Department of Corrections Commissioner discussed the investigation of a semi-truck driver
that drove into a crowd of protesters).
Jaclyn Peiser, ‘Umbrella Man’ went Viral Breaking Windows at a Protest. He was a White
Supremacist Trying to Spark Violence, Police Say, WASH. POST, (July 29, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/29/umbrella-man-white-supremacistminneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/NPZ4-H5JR].
199

200

201

202
203

204
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name, which was quickly amplified by the media. 205 And with the fair and
accurate report privilege, if the police wrongly identified a rioter, the media
would still be shielded from liability even if they shared the official
statement. Regardless of what was reported, the media’s role in quickly
amplifying important information regarding public safety is vital in volatile
situations such as these.
If local media sources were chilled and stopped reporting on
official government proceedings like press releases and news conferences,
people could be without up-to-date news, and others may turn to less
reliable, unregulated social media sources—furthering the spread of
disinformation. 206 In the Twin Cities, the public benefitted from media
reports on official news conferences during a time of unrest, just as in
Larson, the public benefitted from reports on the murder investigation.
Without the fair and accurate reporting privilege, the media’s role in
amplifying official updates of public concern may not be as effective.

c. Public as supervisors
Keeping the public informed about public officials and public
affairs has long been another reason to support the privilege and First
Amendment speech in general. 207 After all, “there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs.” 208 The media is a tool to help
keep government officials responsible to the public. 209 The media’s news
reports on government proceedings not only promote communication
between officials and the public, but “allow the public to assess the quality
of the state and local officials’ response to a public safety emergency.” 210
Extending this privilege to cover reports on official government proceedings
will promote the transparency and accountability of government actors.
Surveillance Video Confirms that Saint Paul Police Officer Jacob Pederson is not
‘Umbrella
Man’,
CITY
OF
SAINT
PAUL,
(June
8,
2020),

205

https://www.stpaul.gov/news/surveillance-video-confirms-saint-paul-police-officer-jacobpederson-not-%E2%80%98umbrella-man%E2%80%99 [https://perma.cc/TX8J-QMMG];
John Shipley, St. Paul Police: Video Shows Officer isn’t ‘Umbrella Man’, PIONEER PRESS,
(June 8, 2020), https://www.twincities.com/2020/06/08/umbrella-man-st-paul-police-officergeorge-floyd-minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/PLF3-Q62P] (noting that this article was
released on the same day of the St. Paul press release).
George Floyd protests: Misleading Footage and Conspiracy Theories Spread Online, BBC
NEWS, (June 2, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/52877751 [https://perma.cc/9AH3DA3H].
Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2020) (quoting Moreno, 610 N.W.2d
at 331); see also Bech, supra note 188, at 1178.
Mills v. State of Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
Id. at 219.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 134.
206

207
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209
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This rationale has not yet been endorsed by the Minnesota Practice
Series as a basis for the privilege. 211 However, after recent civil unrest, this
rationale may provide another perspective to this privilege’s importance.
Today, the media’s role in keeping law enforcement accountable has never
been more important. Even before the killing of George Floyd on May 25,
2020, the amici predicted a situation in which the Black Lives Matter
movement would benefit because the media was afforded a privilege to
unveil corrupt police procedures and amplify the reports. 212 “[T]he law of
this State should incentivize the media to serve as a check on police—to bring
their activities out of the shadows and into the sunlight—especially during
that time period when there is no check in the form of judicial oversight.” 213
To ensure future law enforcement actions are transparent, the media must
be able to report on official law enforcement statements and proceedings
without liability. 214 Furthermore, the media’s role is vital before judicial
intervention occurs to privilege not just judicial or legislative proceedings,
but official news conferences and press releases as well. As the amici point
out, significant corrupt government activity may occur before judicial
oversight begins. 215
Thus, the court’s extension of the fair and accurate reporting
privilege to official news conferences and press releases which regard a
matter of public concern is supported by Minnesota precedent and wellknown policy rationales. 216 This advance is incremental and may only apply
to public proceedings with official government speech. 217 The Larson court
clarified that this privilege will not adhere to “unofficial police comments
that are not a part of an official meeting or statement by law enforcement.” 218
To determine whether a proceeding is privileged, it must be public, regard
a matter of public concern, and be organized by an official in his or her
official duties. 219 In Minnesota, this privilege now extends to judicial
proceedings and official legislative proceedings, including private citizen
speech at city council meetings, as well as official news conferences and
See generally 4 Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014) (citing
agency and public interest in public affairs as the base for the privilege).
See Brief for Amici, supra note 173, at 22.
Id. at 22–23.
Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10, at 27–28 (“Hamilton's reasoning echoes a
commonsensical basis for the privilege: ‘if the press, fearful of libel suits, failed to report on
the judiciary and the proceedings leading up to judicial decisions, the public would not have
an ongoing, comprehensive view of the system, and thus one of the very tools necessary for
a self-governing society would be lost.’”).
See Brief for Amici, supra note 173, at 22.
Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 136 (Minn. 2020).
Id. at 133.
Id. at n.12.
Id. at 133–35.
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press releases regarding a matter of public concern. 220

B.

The test established may favor media protection over an individual’s
right to recover.

While privileging official government proceedings raises concerns
of overly protecting the media, the privilege does have boundaries. This
Section analyzes those boundaries by examining how the majority created a
test that balances conflicting interests, how other jurisdictions have
determined whether a report is fair and accurate, and the implications of
this test’s application to the Larson facts. A jury verdict could either help
create clear standards for the limits of this privilege, or could instead destroy
the ability for a plaintiff to recover for a damaged reputation.

1. Conflicting interests
Before addressing the test’s limits, the conflict between the
media’s ability to report on government proceedings and the plaintiff’s
ability to recover when the media does not fairly report on those
proceedings must be acknowledged. As Gertz established in the defamation
context, “[s]ome tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous
and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful
injury.” 221

a. Right for media to speak
American citizens, including media organizations, have a First
Amendment right to free speech, especially when the speech relates to
matters of public concern. 222 The fair and accurate reporting privilege
advances this First Amendment right by ensuring the media is not liable for
repeating other’s defamatory statements. However, if the media is unfairly
held liable for their publications on government speech, the media may be
chilled in their reporting.
Thus, in endorsing the fair and accurate reporting privilege, the
majority embraced the right to and importance of media speech. Moreover,
the majority’s test, which requires the report to communicate the same
message as the original statement, provides a broad cushion for the media,

See Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 313, 112 N.W. 258, 259 (1907);
Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2000); Larson, 940
N.W.2d at 136.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66
(1964).
220

221
222
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similar to other jurisdictions. 223

b. Right for individuals to recover
However, on the other side of the scale, a private individual’s right
to recover for a tarnished reputation is “highly worthy of protection.” 224
Private individuals are often more vulnerable to tarnished reputations as
they cannot easily rebut false statements. 225 Justice Anderson also recognized
that “the Minnesota Constitution specifically promises the residents of
Minnesota the right to a remedy in our courts for damage to character.” 226
As a result, any expansion of this privilege could deprive a plaintiff,
like Larson, of his or her state constitutional right to recover for damage to
his or her character. 227 If the boundary of what constitutes a fair and accurate
report is too great, individuals may be unable to recover from media
companies for such damage. 228 Additionally, if given a broad scope of
interpretation without liability, disinformation may run amok. 229

2. General survey of the fair and accurate reporting privilege test in
other jurisdictions
Jurisdictions have used part, or all, of section 611 of the
Restatement to influence their fair and accurate reporting privilege. 230
Generally, “the publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a
report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public
that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is
accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.” 231
However, the limits of this common law privilege are not consistent
across jurisdictions. The following Section will broadly describe the
223

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 875 (quoting Jadwin v. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 (Minn. 1985)).
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 149 (Minn. 2020) (Anderson, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
224

225
226

227
228

Id.
See id.; see also Hartzog v. United Press Ass’ns., 202 F.2d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding

that defamatory statements that summarize events inaccurately are actionable).
See infra Section IV.B.3.b.2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (noting that neither the
State Supreme Court or Appellate Court in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, D.C., Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia
has referenced § 611 in case opinions).
229
230

231

Id.
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privilege’s nuances and its accompanying test.

a. Who should decide whether the report is fair and accurate?
Many courts are in consensus that after a defendant has shown the
privilege applies to their publication, a jury may be required to determine
the factual question of whether the published content is fair and accurate. 232
The Fifth Circuit has stated that it is not proper for the court to determine
whether the fair and accurate reporting privilege applies when there exists
more than one conclusion; it is instead a question for a jury. 233 Placing the
responsibility on the jury is necessary because of the extensive fact inquiry. 234
However, courts will take the decision away from a jury if no
reasonable jury could decide a report was unfair and inaccurate. 235 The
Ninth Circuit upheld a district court summary judgment decision that found
a report was fair and accurate as a matter of law. 236 In finding a report both
fair and accurate as a matter of law, the court protected the press from
unnecessary litigation, finding that “speedy resolution of cases involving free
speech is desirable” so that First Amendment rights are not chilled. 237 Other
California courts have held the fair and true inquiry may be a matter of law
if there is no dispute as to the material facts. 238
Additionally, the First Circuit determined that whether a report is
fair and accurate is a matter of law and may be determined by the judge. 239
In these cases, the court found the privilege had been abused, and the
reports were unfair and inaccurate as a matter of law. 240

232
233

See SMOLLA, supra note 13, at § 6:83.
Id. (discussing reversal of summary judgment in Doe v. Doe, 941 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1991)

where an author made an allegation that Dr. DiLeo had played a part in Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s assassination based on a legislative report); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 619, cmt. b (1977).
See Doe, 941 F.2d 280 (addressing whether the fair and accurate reporting privilege was
abused: “abuse issues are indeed jury questions, so long as the facts admit of more than one
conclusion”); see also Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc., 738 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 1984)
(“Where the evidence presents a conflict about whether the published statement is a
substantially true account of what was said in the public proceeding or whether the ordinary
reader would construe the statement as such an account, then the jury must resolve these
issues.”).
See Dorsey v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1992).
234

235
236
237

Id.
Id. (quoting Good Gov’t Grp. of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572, 578

(Cal. 1978).
Id. at 1435–36.
See, e.g., Howell v. Enter. Publ’g Co., 920 N.E.2d 1, 21 (Mass. 2010); see also Barhoum
v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 126711, 2014 Mass. Super. LEXIS 52, at *26 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 7, 2014).
Howell, 920 N.E.2d at 23; Barhoum, No. 126711, 2014 LEXIS 52, at *26.
238
239

240
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b. What is the test to determine whether a report is fair and accurate?
The fair and accurate reporting privilege, adopted most often as a
qualified privilege, can be defeated by showing that the report was not a fair
and accurate summary of the proceeding. 241 While some courts blended
these terms into one test, others attempted to create two separate inquiries. 242
To determine whether an article is a fair and accurate abridgement
of the original proceedings, some courts describe the inquiry as a “gist” or
“sting” test. 243 This test inquires whether a reader would find an article carries
materially greater “sting” than the original proceeding. 244 The test does not
require that an official proceeding be repeated in the exact manner it was
presented; it allows the media a “certain amount of literary license.” 245 In
allowing the media a “degree of flexibility,” they are not required to justify
every word choice as long as the report’s substance is accurately delivered. 246
However, the degree of flexibility is up for interpretation—it remains a
factual inquiry to determine what will make a report substantially harsher,
or change the meaning so that a reader is impressed with a different “gist.” 247
The Restatement emphasizes that a report must not only be
accurate, but fair. 248 This bifurcated approach influenced some courts to
consider each prong separately. 249 It is unclear if this provides a substantially
different outcome.

c. Does additional context defeat the fair and accurate reporting
privilege?
The Restatement cautions that a reporter cannot “make additions
of his own that would convey a defamatory impression.” 250 Some courts
explain that the privilege is forfeited “by making exaggerated additions, or

50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 300 (2020); see also Cox & Callaghan, supra note 10,
at 36.
Compare Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 143 (Minn. 2020) (“Did the reported
statements produce the same effect on the mind of the listener . . . ?”) with Howell, 920
N.E.2d at 22 (“[I]s the report sufficiently factually incorrect or sufficiently mischaracterized
that the impression on the reader is so unfair to the plaintiff as to warrant placing it outside
the privilege?”) (emphasis added).
See Dorsey v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1992).
241

242

243
244
245
246

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. Rptr. 702, 711 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1987)).
247
248
249
250

Id.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1975).

See Howell v. Enter. Publ’g Co., 920 N.E.2d 1, 21 (Mass. 2010).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST. 1975).
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embellishments to the account.” 251 While a report may phrase the title to
attract attention, the media cannot place an inaccurate spin on the
proceedings. 252 Neither will the report be privileged if the report becomes a
one-sided interview or investigation headed by the media. 253
Nonetheless, a dramatic tone does not necessarily mean the report
is unfair or inaccurate. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of a news outlet
that added jocular commentary while reporting on a news conference that
wrongly accused a plaintiff of involvement with a prostitution ring. 254 The
report was privileged because the “defamatory sting” of the news conference
was the same as the report: the article conveyed the same information as
someone who would have attended the press conference. 255 The court found
that a distasteful or insulting tone will not defeat the privilege as long as the
underlying facts remain the same. 256

3. The implications of the fair and accurate test established in Larson
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not stray too far from other
jurisdictions’ treatment of the privilege and its limits. However, based on
these facts, a jury’s interpretation of these instructions is imperative to
maintain the correct balance between the media’s right to speak and the
individual’s right to recover. In this Section, the majority’s test will be
applied to Larson’s facts to understand whether it strikes the proper balance.

a. Application of the test: did the court get it right?
If a jury was presented with the majority’s test on remand, the
inquiry would be whether the additional context provided by the media had
created a harsher “gist” than law enforcement officers actual statements. 257
Pellegrino Food Prod. Co. v. Valley Voice, 875 A.2d 1161, 1165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(citing DeMary v. Latrobe Printing & Publishing Co., 762 A.2d 758, 762 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000)) (noting the privilege was defeated because the author had embellished impressions
she received during a meeting).
Alan v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 973 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that although some of the information was phrased to catch readership’s attention,
it was still fair and accurate).
Tharp v. Media Gen., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 673, 687 (D.S.C. 2013) (finding that a report
was not substantially true when the media did not base their report on the public record of
the plaintiff’s arrest, but instead conducted their own interview and went beyond the facts
that could have been gleaned from the press release).
Lee v. TMZ Prods. Inc., 710 F. App’x 551, 559 (3d Cir. 2017). The news outlet reported
on the Attorney General’s press release stating Lee had been arrested and accused of
involvement with a prostitution ring which was an accurate summary, although it was later
found the plaintiff had been wrongly arrested. Id.
251

252

253

254

255
256
257

Id.
Id.
See 4 Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides—Civil, CIVJIG 50.31 (6th ed. 2014).
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While, as the majority resounds, a reasonable juror could construe that the
media’s additional contextual material creates a harsher “gist” and destroy
the privilege, a reasonable juror should find that the media’s additional
contextual material changed the meaning of the original news conference
statements. 258 The media’s reports created a substantially harsher “gist” than
what a person attending the press conference would have heard. 259
While KARE 11 and the St. Cloud Times did report the same
underlying message—that Larson had been taken into custody in connection
with the murder—they added additional context. 260 For example:
Police say that man—identified as 34-year-old Ryan
Larson—ambushed officer Decker and shot him twice—
killing him. . . . He [Officer Decker] was the good guy last
night going to check on someone who needed help. That
someone was 34-year-old Ryan Larson who investigators
say opened fire on Officer Tom Decker for no reason
anyone can fathom. 261
This statement was based on the press conference and release in which law
enforcement officers repeatedly emphasized the early and ongoing nature
of the investigation. 262 At the press conference, a deputy stated that Larson,
the subject of a welfare check, had been taken into custody; however,
“[Larson] was interviewed . . . and some of that investigation is still
ongoing.” 263 When asked whether Larson was the shooter, the representative
refused to acknowledge that Larson was involved with the shooting and
again made clear that the investigation was still ongoing, so the officers could
not comment on that matter. 264
A viewer of the KARE 11 news report or a reader of the St. Cloud
Times would have gathered that the police arrested Larson for ambushing,
shooting, and killing a police officer—when in fact, the law enforcement
officers said no such thing. 265 They only indicated that Larson was arrested
as a suspect, the investigation was early and ongoing, and they were
continuing to follow up on all other leads. 266 However, Larson’s reputation
was destroyed because of the media’s intense focus on him as the only
suspected murderer, despite his later exoneration as a suspect. 267 While the
258

Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 145 (Minn. 2020).

See id. at 161–62 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id. at 128.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 158–59 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This language was
vocalized no fewer than thirteen times during the press conference. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id.
See id. at 126–29. While no one had ever been arrested for the killing, another person of
interest had committed suicide after police officers questioned him. Id.
259
260
261
262

263
264
265
266
267

1160

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

majority correctly found that statements six through eight did not convey
defamatory meaning or were non-actionable opinion, statements one
through five provide a much different effect on the mind of a viewer/reader
than what a person would have understood from the news conference.

b. On remand
The Minnesota Supreme Court remanded the case to the district
court to decide whether the privilege was defeated with this inquiry: “Did
the reported statements produce the same effect on the mind of the listener
or the reader as the oral and written statements of the law enforcement
officers at the press conference or in the press release?” 268 The court found
that a remand was necessary because, first, the instructions provided at
district court were incorrect, 269 and second, a reasonable juror could find that
the reports were unfair and inaccurate reports of the news conferences or
press releases. 270 The majority practiced judicial restraint and sent the case
back to a jury on remand. 271 The following Section will predict the impacts
of this decision.

1. A verdict for Larson
Justice Anderson, in dissent, argues that the news broadcasts and
articles “did not communicate the same meaning as the press conference as
a matter of law,” because the reports projected a meaning of finality, whereas
the press conference emphasized the early stages of the investigation. 272
While the majority did not engage in this analysis, it is very possible that a
jury could find that the reports and original proceedings did not convey the
same meaning.
A verdict in favor of Larson would establish clear boundaries of the
fair and accurate reporting privilege in Minnesota that do not yet exist. 273
268
269

Id. at 148.
See id. at 139. The jury was given instructions on “falsity,” which asked whether the

statements were substantially accurate. Because these instructions did not specify whether
the inquiry was to the underlying statements or to the report compared to the original
statements, the majority finds the instructions were inaccurate. See id.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 161 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Because Justice Anderson
finds an individual’s right to recover for damage to personal reputation to be so compelling,
he would take the question from the jury and find the statements false as a matter of law and
the defendants liable for negligence damages. Id.
See, e.g., Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 334 (Minn. 2000).
This case, one of the only other modern decisions regarding the fair and accurate report
privilege in Minnesota, did not have enough of a record to determine whether the privilege
was defeated.
270
271
272

273
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Thus, a verdict for Larson would establish that on these facts, additional
context changed the meaning of a report and defeated the fair and accurate
reporting privilege. Additionally, Larson would be compensated for the
damages to his reputation, and the importance of an individual’s right to
recover for defamation in Minnesota would be bolstered. 274

2. A verdict for respondents
However, if on remand, the jury found the statements to be fair and
accurate reports of the original proceedings, broad media protections may
result and disfavor an individual’s right to recover for a damaged reputation.
The change in meaning from the original proceeding to the media reports,
in this case, would set a standard for the media’s ability to report on future
proceedings with flair. It could open the door to broad interpretations of
what is fair and accurate and steamroll not only Larson’s, but future
individual’s reputations. Providing the media with a broad interpretative
lens may lead to disinformation or “fake news.” 275
Justice Anderson emphasizes the need for a “free and robust press
that is motivated to inform and educate the public about important public
matters” while recognizing that the media must be responsible in their
work. 276 And in an era of fake news, holding the media accountable for
reporting disinformation, disguised as government news, is a commendable
goal. 277 In this context especially, when the media is held out as amplifying
government speech, there is a heightened need to hold media companies
liable if their reporting is not fair and accurate. Additionally, when the
statements concern a private individual, the media must report even more
fairly and accurately because private individuals are not able to easily
recover. 278 There is much at stake in this case if a jury were to find statements
See Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 148–49 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(emphasizing the importance of an individual’s right to recover for damage to personal
reputation).
David O. Klein & Joshua R. Wueller, Fake News: A Legal Perspective, 20 J. INTERNET
L., Apr. 2017, at 6 (defining “fake news” as “online publication of intentionally or knowingly
false statements of facts.”). However, under this definition, the privilege could be defeated
because the statements were made knowingly to be intentionally false.
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 161 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See Björnstjern Baade, Don’t Call a Spade a Shovel – Crucial Subtleties in the Definition
of Fake News and Disinformation, VERFASSUNGSBLOG, (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://verfassungsblog.de/dont-call-a-spade-a-shovel/
[https://perma.cc/XFA6-2M8Q]
(“[F]ake news or disinformation can also encompass distorted statements, which are in
themselves factually correct, but presented in a way that makes it likely that false conclusions
are drawn from them.”).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address: Fake News, Weaponized Defamation and the
First Amendment, 47 SW. L. REV. 291, 292 (2018) (“When it comes to reputation, a person
who has been tarnished by false speech, may never be able to regain the lost reputation,
setting the record straight usually fails to eliminate the tarnish.”); see also Larson, 940
274

275

276
277

278
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one through five to be fair and accurate.

c. Was there a better way?
While the Minnesota Supreme Court practiced judicial restraint in
sending the determination of a fair and accurate report back to district court,
there is much at risk if a jury found this to be a fair and accurate report.
Moreover, if the case were to be settled out of court, the State of Minnesota
would, again, be left without clear boundaries of what types of facts
constitute a fair and accurate report. 279
The court could have engaged in Justice Anderson’s analysis to
decide the case as a matter of law. 280 This decision would be beneficial for
Larson and could create workable boundaries of the privilege to hold the
media accountable in Minnesota. In Massachusetts, the court decides
whether a report is fair and accurate as a matter of law, finding that the
privilege is already very generous. 281 While this is usually a fact-intensive
inquiry, the record is clear on these facts, and without other precedent as to
how this privilege is applied in Minnesota, 282 the jury may not understand
how “fair” and “accurate” are applied in practice. On the one hand, if the
court were to instead decide this case as a matter of law, a clearer picture of
the privilege’s limits would exist. On the other hand, in remanding back to
a jury, the court has followed its precedent and maintained judicial
restraint. 283
N.W.2d at 156 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As Justice Anderson
recognized, an individual’s right to recover for defamatory statements which tarnish their
reputation is incredibly important.
While the court did decide that statements seven and eight were fair and accurate as a
matter of law, the statements at issue—those that added additional context—are much more
telling of how much flexibility the media may have in their reports. Larson, 940 N.W.2d at
160 (Anderson, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id. at 161. Justice Anderson stated, “[w]e have decided questions of falsity as a matter
of law where the content of an alleged defamatory statement and an actual statement is
undisputed,” and proceeded to find that because statements one through eight
communicated a meaning of finality, the statements should be found not fair and accurate as
a matter of law. Id.
See Barhoum v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 126711, 2014 LEXIS 52, at *9 (Mass. Mar. 7,
2014). Investigators circulated an e-mail to the press asking for more information about two
suspects in relation to the Boston Marathon bombing. A corresponding news article gave the
impression that the two suspects were guilty and the court determined it was, as a matter of
law, not a fair and accurate report. A settlement followed this decision. See also Howell v.
Enter. Publ’g Co., 920 N.E.2d 1, 21 (Mass. 2010) (noting that the standard is generous and
requires judge to decide whether privilege attaches).
See Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 334 (Minn. 2000)
(holding that while city council meeting is within the privilege’s scope, there was not enough
of a record to determine whether the privilege was defeated).
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 140–41 (holding that when more than one conclusion can be
drawn from undisputed facts, the question should go to the jury).
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CONCLUSION

Because of Larson, the fair and accurate reporting privilege is
extended to publications regarding matters of public concern made by
public officials at official press conferences or in official press releases. The
public is benefited because limiting media liability encourages reporting on
government proceedings that are timely, fair, and accurate—a necessity in
our world today. This protection may encourage the media to bring the
public closer to government happenings and may even unveil corruption.
However, these commendable outcomes do not come without
caution. Although this extension brings good news to the media, this
extension will remove a defamed individual’s ability to recover from the
organization that amplified the defamatory statements if the media reported
fairly and accurately. Additionally, although the court engaged in a robust
discussion that established some limits, it risked a lot more than Larson’s
reputation by remanding the decision to a jury. If, on remand, a jury were
to find that the media’s report was fair and accurate, a future plaintiff’s ability
to recover for defamatory statements may be diminished. 284 Moreover, it
could allow the media a broad cushion in their reports of government
proceedings, which—without fear of liability—could only increase
disinformation and fake news. Nevertheless, hope remains that one’s
reputation will not be sacrificed in the name of media protection.

284

See supra Section IV.B.3.b.2.

